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 Environmental Ethics 
   HOLMES ROLSTON, III 
Environmental ethics is theory and practice about appropriate concern for, values in, and 
duties regarding the natural world. By classical accounts, ethics is people relating to 
people in justice and love. Environmental ethics starts with human concerns for a quality 
environment, and some think this shapes the ethic from start to finish. Others hold that, 
beyond inter-human concerns, values are at stake when humans relate to animals, 
plants, species and ecosystems. According to their vision, humans ought to find nature 
sometimes morally considerable in itself, and this turns ethics in new directions. 
1    The Environmental Turn 
Humans are the only self-reflective, deliberative moral agents. Ethics is for people. 
But are humans the only valuable, valuing agents in an otherwise value-free world? 
Humans co-inhabit Earth with five to ten million species. Nature has equipped Homo 
sapiens, the wise species, with a conscience. Perhaps conscience is less wisely used than 
it ought to be when, as in classical Enlightenment ethics, it excludes the global com-
munity of life from consideration, with the resulting paradox that the self-consciously 
moral species acts only in its collective self-interest toward all the rest. Environmental 
ethics claims that we humans are not so 'enlightened' as once supposed, not until we 
reach a more considerate ethic. 
If someone had been attempting to foresee the future of philosophy at the middle of 
the twentieth century, one of the most surprising developments would have been the 
rise of environmental philosophy. Environmental ethics remained unknown until 
the mid-1970s. That was to change rapidly. Philosophers have published dozens 
of anthologies and systematic works in the field, and courses are taught in several 
hundred universities and colleges on many continents. There are four professional jour-
nals. The International Society for Environmental Ethics (ISEE) has 400 members in 
20 countries. The World Congress of Philosophy (1998) devoted four sections to 
environmental philosophy, with dozens of other related papers. 
The website bibliography of the ISEE contains 8,000 articles and books not only by 
philosophers, ethicists and theologians, but also by policy-makers, lawyers, envi-
ronmental professionals, foresters, conservation and wildlife biologists, ecologists, 
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economists, sociologists, historians, developers and business persons—all with an 
ethical concern about human uses of the natural environment. Although the first 
edition of this book contained no chapter on environmental ethics, this second edition 
includes this ethical revising. 
Philosophers have thought about nature for millennia. Although there is an ethic 
implicit in many of these world views, this was never much developed in the West. 
Following the Enlightenment and the scientific revolution, in secular philosophies 
nature came to be regarded as a valueless realm, governed by mechanistic causal forces. 
Values arose only with the interests and preferences of humans. In the prevailing 
Judeo-Christian theologies, God created a good Earth with myriads of creatures, and 
subjected these to human dominion. For four centuries, Western philosophy and 
THEOLOGY (chapter 15) were both dominantly humanistic, or, in current vocabulary, 
anthropocentric. 
Environmental ethics applies ethics to the environment, analogously to ethics 
applied to BUSINESS (chapter 19), MEDICINE (chapter 17), engineering, LAW (chapter 
13) and technology. Such humanist applications may be challenging: limiting 
population growth or development, questioning consumerism and the distribution 
of wealth, advocating the inclusion of women or aboriginal peoples, or fearing global 
warming. 
Environmental quality is necessary for quality of human life. Humans dramatically 
rebuild their environments; still, their lives, filled with artefacts, are lived in a natural 
ecology where resources—soil, air, water, photosynthesis, climate—are matters of 
life and death. Culture and nature have entwined destinies, similar to (and related to) 
the way minds are inseparable from bodies. So ethics needs to be applied to the 
environment. 
At depth, however, environmental ethics is more radical in 'applying ethics' (so 
many advocates claim) outside the sector of human interests. Contemporary ethics has 
been concerned to be inclusive: the poor as well as the rich, women as well as men, 
future generations as well as the present. Environmental ethics is even more inclusive. 
Whales slaughtered, wolves extirpated, whooping cranes and their habitats disrupted, 
ancient forests cut, Earth threatened by global warming—these are ethical questions 
intrinsically, owing to values destroyed in nature, as well as also instrumentally, owing 
to human resources jeopardized. Humans need to include nature in their ethics; 
humans need to include themselves in nature. 
Somewhat ironically, just when humans, with their increasing industry and tech-
nology, seemed further and further from nature, having more knowledge about natural 
processes and more power to manage them, the natural world has emerged as a focus 
of ethical concern. Human power to affect nature has dramatically escalated, as with 
species loss or global warming. Exploding populations raise concerns that humans are 
not in a sustainable relationship with their environment. Nor have they distributed the 
benefits derived from natural resources equitably. Nor have they been sensitive enough 
to the welfare of the myriads of other species. 
The plan here is to outline six levels of concern: humans, animals, organisms, 
species, ecosystems, Earth. These will be criss-crossed with over a dozen differing 
approaches to environmental ethics: humanistic ethics, animal welfare ethics, 
biocentrism, deep ecology, land ethics, theological environmental ethics, ethics 
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of ecojustice, communitarian ethics with circles of concern, environmental virtue 
ethics, axiological environmental ethics, political ecology, sustainable development 
ethics, bioregionalism, ecofeminism, postmodern environmental ethics, and an ethics 
of place. 
2   Humans: People and their World 
Humans are helped or hurt by the condition of their environment, and that there ought 
to be some ethic concerning the environment can be doubted only by those who believe 
in no ethics at all. Ethics will have a concern for what humans have at stake 
there—benefits, costs, and their just distribution, risks, pollution levels, rights and torts, 
environmental sustainability and quality, the interests of future generations, An 
anthropocentric ethics claims that people are both the subject and the object of 
ethics. Humans can have no duties to rocks, rivers, nor to wildflowers or 
ecosystems, and almost none to birds or bears. Humans have serious duties only to 
each other. Anthropocentrists may wish to save these things for the benefits they bring. 
But the environment is the wrong kind of primary target for an ethic. Nature is a 
means, not an end in itself. Man is the measure of things, said Protagoras, an ancient 
Greek philosopher, setting the tone of philosophy since. 
Humans deliberately and extensively rebuild the spontaneous natural environment 
and make the rural and urban environments in which they reside. We care about the 
quality of life in these hybrids of nature and culture. Ethics arises to protect various 
goods within our cultures; this, historically, has been its principal arena. As philoso-
phers frequently model this, ethics is a feature of the human SOCIAL CONTRACT (pp. 
622-7). People arrange a society where they and the others with whom they live do 
not (or ought not) lie, steal, kill. This is right, and one reason it is right is that people 
must co-operate to survive; and the more they reliably co-operate the more they flour-
ish. One way of envisioning this is the so-called ORIGINAL POSITION (p. 261), where one 
enters into contract, figuring out what is best for a person on average, oblivious to the 
specific circumstances of one's time and place. This is where a sense of universality, or 
at least pan-culturalism, in morality has a plausible rational basis. 
A great deal of the work of environmental ethics can be done from within the social 
contract. Most of environmental policy is of this kind. Humans need to be healthy. 
Health, however, is not simply a matter of biology from the skin-in. Environmental 
health, from the skin-out, is equally as important. It is hard to have a healthy culture 
on a sick environment. More than that, humans desire a quality environment, enjoy-
ing the amenities of nature—wildlife and wildflowers, scenic views, places of 
solitude—as well as the commodities—timber, water, soil, natural resources. 
Supporting environmental health and a quality environment can certainly be counted 
as duties within a social contract. 
Environmental ethics, by this account, is founded on what we can call a human right 
to nature. The World Commission on Environment and Development claims: All 
human beings have the fundamental right to an environment adequate for their health 
and well-being' (1987b: 9). This includes the basic natural givens: air, soil, water, func-
tioning ecosystems, hydrologic cycles and so on.  These could previously be taken for 
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granted. But now the right must be made explicit and defended. Note that is not 
any claim against or for nature itself; rather it is a claim made against other humans 
who might deprive us of such nature. 
The four most critical issues that humans currently face are peace, population, 
development and environment. All are interrelated. Human desires for maximum 
development drive population increases, escalate exploitation of the environment and 
fuel the forces of war. Those who exploit persons will typically exploit nature as 
readily—animals, plants, species, ecosystems and the Earth itself. Ecofeminists have 
found this to be especially true where both women and nature are together exploited. 
The interests of environmental ethics done from perspectives of political ecology, 
sustainable development, bioregionalism, ecojustice, from an ethics of stewardship, 
or human virtues in caring, or a sense of place—all these tend to be humanistic and to 
recognise that nature and culture have entwined destinies, Bryan G, Norton (1991) 
claims that fully enlightened anthropocentrists and more naturalistic 
environmentalists will almost entirely agree on environmental policy, what he calls 
a 'convergence hypothesis'. 
3    Animals: Beasts in Flesh and Blood 
Ethics is for people, but is ethics only about people? Wild animals do not make man the 
measure of things at all. There is no better evidence of non-human values and valuers 
than spontaneous wild life, born free and on its own. Animals hunt and howl, find 
shelter, seek out their habitats and mates, care for their young, and flee from threats. 
They suffer injury and lick their wounds. Animals maintain a valued self-identity as 
they cope through the world. They defend their own lives because they have a good of 
their own. There is somebody there behind the fur or feathers. 
An animal values its own life for what it is in itself, without further contributory ref-
erence, although of course it inhabits an ecosystem on which its life-support depends, 
Animals are value-able, able to value things in their world, their own lives intrinsically 
and their resources instrumentally. So there can and ought to be an animal welfare 
ethic; or, some prefer to say, an animal rights ethic. 
Such ethicists may still say that value exists only where a subject has an object 
of interest, only now recognizing that the pleasures and pains of non-human subjects 
must be considered. At least some of what counts in ethics is generic to our kinship 
with animals, not just specific to our species. Common sense first and science later 
teaches that we human animals have many similarities with non-human animals. 
No one doubts that animals grow hungry, thirsty, hot, tired, excited, sleepy. The protein 
coding sequences of DNA for structural genes in chimpanzees and humans are more 
than 99 per cent identical. 
Confronted with such facts, we have to philosophise over them. The conclusion 
seems to follow that, whatever our unique differences as Homo sapiens, there is also a 
kinship with others. By parity of reasoning, it seems that what humans value in them-
selves, if they find this elsewhere, they ought also to value in non-human others. We 
value what does not stand directly in our lineage but is enough like ourselves that 
we are drawn by spillover to shared phenomena manifest in others. The principle of 
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universalizability demands that an ethicist recognize corresponding values in fellow 
persons. Growth in ethical sensitivity, or virtue, has often required enlarging the circle 
of neighbours to include other races and cultures. But these widening circles do not 
end with reciprocating moral agents, A communitarian ethics finds enlarging con-
centric circles around the moral self: family, local community, nation, humankind, 
and—in a surrounding though more remote circle—animals. 
A moose does not suffer the winter cold, as we might (humans having evolved in the 
tropics). Perhaps the warbler is not glad when it sings. But one must not commit the 
humanistic fallacy of supposing no natural analogues to what humans plainly value. 
We have every logical, biological and psychological reason to value positive degrees 
of kinship. There will arise conflicts of interest. There might even be bad kinds (rat-
tlesnakes?), but prima facie, at least, these kindred lives count. They are good adapted 
fits in their places, co-evolved with others. Presumptively, animal life is an EVOLUTION-
ARY SUCCESS (pp. 320-30) and a good thing. 
Some may think it logically or psychologically impossible to value kinds of experi-
ence that we cannot share (those of the snakes), True, animal lives do not coincide with 
our own, and there are realms of experience that we cannot reach and which are 
difficult to evaluate. But neither should we underestimate the human genius for 
thoughtful appreciation and considerable respect for alien forms. Meanwhile, the 
claims of kindred animals ought to count in environmental ethics. 
4   Organisms: Respect for Life 
A biocentric ethics asks about appropriate respect toward all living things, not only the 
wildlife and farm animals, but now the butterflies and the sequoia trees. Otherwise, 
most of the biological world has yet to be taken into account: lower animals, insects, 
microbes, plants. Over 96 per cent of species are invertebrates or plants; only a tiny 
fraction of individual organisms are sentient animals. Considering plants makes the 
differences between biocentrism and an animal rights ethic clear. 
A plant is a spontaneous life system, self-maintaining with a controlling genetic 
programme (though with no controlling centre, no brain). A plant is not a subject, but 
neither is it an inanimate object, like a stone. Plants, quite alive, are unified entities of 
the botanical although not of the zoological kind; that is, they are not unitary organ-
isms highly integrated with centred neural control, but they are modular organisms, 
with a meristem that can repeatedly and indefinitely produce new vegetative modules, 
additional stem nodes and leaves when there is available space and resources, as well 
as new reproductive modules, fruits and seeds. 
Plants do not have ends-in-view, and in that familiar sense they do not have goals. 
Yet the plant grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds and resists death, maintaining 
a botanical identity. All this, from one perspective, is just biochemistry—the whir 
and buzz of organic molecules, enzymes, proteins—as humans are too, from one 
perspective. But from an equally valid—and objective—perspective, the morphology 
and metabolism that the organism projects is a valued state. Vital is a more ample 
word now than biological. We could even argue that the genetic set is a normative set, 
it distinguishes between what is and what ought to be—not of course in any moral or 
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conscious sense—but in the sense that the organism is an axiological system. The 
genome is a set of conservation molecules. A life is spontaneously defended for what 
it is itself. 
An objector can say, 'The plants don't care, so why should I?' But plants do 
care—using botanical standards, the only form of caring available to them. The plant 
life per se is defended—an intrinsic value. Though things do not matter to trees, a 
great deal matters for them. We ask, 'What's the matter with that tree?' If it is lacking 
sunshine and soil nutrients, we arrange for these, and the tree goes to work and 
recovers its health. Such organisms do 'take account' of themselves; and we should 
take account of them. 
For classical ethicists, all this seems odd. Plants are not valuers with preferences that 
can be satisfied or frustrated. It seems curious to say that wildflowers have rights, or 
moral standing, or need our sympathy, or that we should consider their point of view. 
But biocentrists claim that environmental ethics is not merely an affair of psychology, 
but of biology. The concentric circles keep expanding. Every organism has a 
good-of-its-kind; it defends its own kind as a good kind. Perhaps man is the only 
deliberative measurer of things, but man does not have to make himself the only 
measure he uses. Life is a better measure. 
Adaptive Fits and Inclusive Ethics 
Ethics and biology have had uncertain relations over recent centuries. An often-heard 
argument forbids moving from what is the case (a description of biological facts) to what 
ought to be (a prescription of duty); any who do so commit the NATURALISTIC FALLACY (pp. 
805-6). On the other hand, if spontaneous natural lives are of value in themselves, and 
if humans encounter and jeopardize such value, it would seem that humans ought not 
to destroy values in nature, not at least without overriding justification producing greater 
value. Perhaps some of these plant kinds are bad kinds (poison oak?), but again, as with 
the animals, in their place they are adapted, they are presumptively well suited for life in 
their niches. The counter-risk is a fallacy of mislocated value, a humanistic mistake 
taking value to lie exclusively in the satisfaction of our human preferences. The problem 
is that, despite the excellence of our increasingly scientific accounts in biology, nature 
has been mapped philosophically as a moral blank space, as value-free in and of itself. 
Theologically, we forgot God's good creation. 
Ethics is significantly a matter of respecting others for what they are in themselves, 
apart from my self-interests, That is altruism. But a humanistic ethic is not really yet 
'altruistic' toward any non-human others; even an animal rights ethic finds value only in 
our animal cousins. Environmental ethics, the most altruistic of ethics, takes accounts of 
all other living organisms. This nowhere denies trade-offs and degrees of significance and 
value. Given our own biological needs, humans too have to make a way through the 
world, and this requires defending ourselves (against poison oak) and capturing values 
present in plants and animals, for food and shelter. Humans do so not only as biological 
agents but as moral agents. We have, if you like, a right to eat; we also have a responsi-
bility to respect the vitalities of the fauna and flora around us. A full ethics is inclusive 
of every living organism. 
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5    Species and Biodiversity: Lifelines in Jeopardy 
At the species level, responsibilities increase. So does the intellectual challenge 
of defending duties to species. What are species? The question is scientific, one to 
be answered by biologists. Have humans duties to them? The question is ethical, to 
be answered by philosophers. On a biological level, species are historical lineages, 
Ursus arctos (the grizzly bear) is a dynamic ongoing bear-bear-bear sequence, a 
specific form of life historically maintained over generations for thousands of years. The 
sow devotes her life to her cubs. The individual represents (re-presents) a species in 
each new generation. It is a token of a type, and the type is more important than the 
token. 
Moral Concern for Species Lines 
As with plants, classical ethicists will find species often (though not always) to be useful 
natural resources. But they find species obscure objects of direct moral concern. Species, 
though they can be endangered, cannot 'care'—so returns the objection we heard before. 
They just come and go. Around 98 per cent of the species that have inhabited Earth are 
extinct. Most ethicists say that one ought not needlessly to destroy endangered species; 
virtuous persons are not vandals. But many will give humanistic reasons, and think this 
enough. 
More radical environmental ethicists claim that one ought to respect these life lines. 
Biological identity need not attach solely to the individual centred or modular organism, 
an animal or a plant. Biological identity can be reasserted genetically over generations, 
persisting as a discrete, vital pattern over time. The life that the individual has is some-
thing passing through the individual as much as something it intrinsically possesses, and 
a comprehensive respect for life finds it appropriate to attach duty dynamically to the spe- 
cific forms of life. The value resides in the dynamic form: the individual inherits this, 
exemplifies it and passes it on. 
The appropriate survival unit is the appropriate location of persistent valuing, where 
the defence of life goes on in regeneration, as individual members of a species are given 
over to survival of their kind. Plants and animals not only defend their own lives; they 
defend their kinds. Such kinds are the dynamism of life.  A shutdown of the life stream 
on Earth is the most destructive event possible. In threatening Earth's biodiversity, the 
wrong that humans are doing is stopping the historical vitality of life. Every extinction 
is an incremental decay in this stopping life. 'Ought species x to exist?' is a distributive 
increment in the collective question, 'Ought life on Earth to exist?' Since life on Earth Is 
an aggregate of many species, when humans jeopardize species, the burden of proof lies 
with those who wish deliberately to extinguish a species and simultaneously to care for 
life on Earth. 
Few past philosophers have even raised the question of duties to species, much less 
answered it.  Now such duty is becoming clearer. If it makes any sense to claim that 
one ought not to kill individuals without justification, it makes more sense to claim that 
one ought not to extinguish species lines, without extraordinary justification. This is a 
kind of super-killing. 
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6   Ecosystems: The Land Ethic 
Aldo Leopold, a forester-ecologist and prophet of environmental ethics, claimed, 
famously: 'A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of 
the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.'  'That land is a community 
is the basic concept of ecology, but that land is to be loved and respected is an extension 
of ethics' (Leopold 1969:224-5, viii-ix). In a holistic ethic, this ecosystemic level in which 
all organisms are embedded also counts morally—in some respects more than any of the 
component organisms, because the systemic processes have generated, continue to 
support, and integrate tens of thousands of member organisms. The appropriate unit for 
moral concern is the fundamental unit of development and survival. That, we were just 
saying, is species lines. But a species is what it is where it is, encircled by an ecology. 
In an axiological ethics, here is systemic value, as well as instrumental and intrinsic 
value. Value lies in processes as well as in products. To value individuals among the fauna 
and flora and not the evolutionary and ecological processes is like valuing the eggs that 
the golden goose produces more than the goose able to produce them. It would be a 
mistake to value the goose only instrumentally. A goose that lays golden eggs is systemi- 
cally valuable. How much more so is an ecosystem that generates myriads of species, or 
even, as we soon see, an Earth that produces billions of species, ourselves included, 
A land ethic might seem a naturalistic ethic, but people are living on this land, and 
so nature and culture soon mix. Trying to map the human environments, we are 
valuing three main territories: the urban, the rural and the wild—all three of which 
are necessary if we are to be three-dimensional persons. Nature is much present in the 
hybrid habitats of rural landscapes; we need an ethic for agro-ecosystems. Wildlife can 
extensively remain on landscapes put to multiple use; and so we need an ethic of wildlife 
management. We need an ethic for forests and farmlands, for the countryside. Nature 
is present in, and a support of, our cities as well. 
People on Landscapes Environmental Policy and Managing Nature 
Environmental ethics has to be directed to human dominated, managed, disturbed (and 
often degraded) landscapes, Such a land ethic must be informed about ecosystem health, 
but more focused on human ecology, on political ecology. Government and business are 
large influences in our lives; both have vast amounts of power to affect the environment 
for good or ill. Social systems make humans behave as they do toward their environment, 
and any effective reformation will have to be worked out in reformed,  more environ- 
mentally sensitive social institutions. Environmental ethics cannot be an ecosystem ethic 
pure and simple; there is only an ethic about humans relating to their ecosystems, in the 
economies in which they live. 
Environmental ethics must be corporate; action must be taken in concert: green pol-
itics, green business, The natural environment is crucially a 'commons', a public good. 
Policies will need to relate such a commons to capitalism, ownership of the means of pro-
duction, market forces, the concerns of labour, real estate development policies, property 
rights of individuals, population control, equitable distribution of the products made 
from natural resources. There is no 'invisible hand' that guarantees an optimal harmony 
between a people and their landscape, or that the right things are done in encounter with 
fauna, flora, species, ecosystems, or regarding future generations. 
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Humans are mostly moved to act in their self-interest; and they will do so to the degra-
dation of the environment—unless environmental policy gives them incentive other-
wise. Short-term self-interest will get out of hand, especially when coupled with social 
power. Thus, to respect ecosystems and keep them healthy, to ensure environmental 
quality even in a humanistic ethics, there is a need for laws to regulate private and busi-
ness use; these regulations are imposed in the longer-range public interest by the forces 
of democracy. 
What about spontaneous wild nature? Wilderness areas and nature reserves are part 
of our global environment, and yet not our human habitat. The wild is an environment 
that humans need and ought to respect; they may like to visit there. But the wild is not 
an environment in which we can reside and still be human. 'Man is by nature a politi-
cal animal', said Aristotle—the animal who builds and inhabits a polis, a town. That is 
why, some say, ethics arises to govern conduct in the polis, with its social contract, ori-
enting behaviour to protect the goods of human nature and culture. Hence, they say, 
ethics does not belong in the wild. It is for people, in urban or rural environments. 
But, again, a more radical environmental ethics, resolving to be quite inclusive and 
comprehensive, holds that humans can and ought to set aside wild areas for what they 
are in themselves, areas which we try to manage as little as possible, or to manage 
human uses of them so as to let nature takes its course, as far as we can. Virtuous 
persons ought to respect the integrity, the freedom of life in all its wildness. True, 
humans are the dominant species on the landscape, which they must manage. But 
humans are also a moral species, who can and ought to respect evolutionary ecosys-
tems—at least on representative parts of the landscape. 
An 'ethics of place' has a tendency to see values largely as those that human inhab-
itants 'place' on nature. The English love their countryside. But ought this ethic not also 
be sensitive to values that are already 'in place' before we humans arrive to dwell there 
(warblers defending the good of their kind)? Part of the needed ethic does demand a 
constructed sense of place; a person needs an embodied sense of residence. Another 
part respects nature as it is found to be in itself, oblivious to the specific circumstances 
of a person's particular time and place. The personal view must be complemented by a 
regional view, indeed a global view. 
Bioregionalism emphasizes living on regional landscapes. The most workable ethic 
is where persons identify with their geography. People are likely to be most motivated 
by what they have at stake on their at-home landscapes. True, one ought to have 
concern for endangered species, vanishing wildlife, intrinsic natural values or wilder-
ness conservation; but that is not what orients day-to-day behaviour. What is politically 
possible is concern about the countryside of everyday experience. After all, ecology is 
about living at home (Greek: oikos, 'house'). That is where the land ethic really oper-
ates. That is where people can act, where they vote and pay taxes. They need to be 
'natives', as much as 'citizens', Michel Serres (1995: 20) argues that 'the old social 
contract ought to be joined by a natural contract'. 
A bioregion, says Kirkpatrick Sale (1985: 43), is 'a place defined by its life forms, its 
topography, and its biota, rather than by human dictates; a region governed by nature, 
not legislature'. A focus on bioregions permits 'ecosystem management', a much 
lauded goal. Bioregionalism appeals to geographers, landscape architects, developers, 
state legislators, county commissioners—all those charged with decisions about a 
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quality environment. Humans need to learn to 'reinhabit' their landscapes. This is 
environmental ethics on a human scale. 
Aldo Leopold concludes with a land ethic that he recommends universally. It is 
no accident, however; rather, it is essential that the earlier pages of his Sand County 
(Wisconsin) Almanac remember a January thaw, the spring flowering of Draba, the 
April mating dance of the woodcock. Leopold's biographical residence is the personal 
backing to his ethic. An environmental ethic needs roots in locality. 
Taking a model from ecology, the deep ecology movement emphasizes the ways in 
which humans, although individual selves, can and ought to extend such selves 
through a webwork of connections. The human 'self' is not something found from the 
skin-in, an atomistic individual set over against other individuals and the rest of nature. 
Ecology dissolves any firm boundary between humans and the natural world. Ecology 
does not know encapsulated egos over against their environment. Ecological thinking 
is a kind of vision across boundaries. Humans have such entwined destinies with the 
natural world that their richest quality of life involves a larger identification with these 
communities. Such transformation of the personal self will result in an appropriate 
care for the environment. 
Ecofeminists may add that women are better suited for such caring than men 
—at least men too much dominated by the 'dominion' view, too much inclined to be 
managers. 
7   Earth: Ethics on the Home Planet 
Views of Earth from space are the most impressive photographs ever taken. They are 
the most widely distributed ever, having been seen by well over half the persons 
on Earth. Few are not moved to a moment of truth, at least in their pensive moods. 
The whole Earth is aesthetically stimulating, philosophically challenging and ethically 
disturbing. 'I remember so vividly', said Michael Collins, 'what I saw when I looked 
back at my fragile home—a glistening, inviting beacon, delicate blue and white, a tiny 
outpost suspended in the black infinity. Earth is to be treasured and nurtured, some-
thing precious that must endure' (Collins 1980: 6). There is a vision of an Earth ethic 
in what he sees. 
But, reply the anthropocentrists, that this is 'our home planet' reveals the real focus 
of ethical concern: humans and their sustainable future. Humans can and ought to be 
held responsible for what they are doing to their Earth, which is their life-support 
system. But—so this argument goes—these are duties owed by people to other people; 
caring for the planet is a means to this end. 
Environmental ethics on global and regional scales is inextricably coupled with 
development ethics. The Rio Declaration begins: 'Human beings are at the centre 
of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive 
life in harmony with nature'. The United Nations World Commission on Environment 
and Development declares: 'Sustainable development is development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs'. That applies to agriculture, forestry, water use, pollution levels, indus-
try, resource extraction, urbanization, national policies and strategies. 'Sustainable' 
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coupled with 'development' expects continued growth, but not such as degrades oppor-
tunities and environments for the future. 
Ethics—this argument claims—ought not to confuse people and their Earth. Earth 
is a big rockpile like the moon, only one on which the rocks are watered and illumi-
nated in such a way that they support life. Earth is no doubt precious as a means of life 
support, but it is not precious in itself. There is nobody there in a planet. There is not 
even the objective vitality of an organism, or the genetic transmission of a species line. 
Earth is not even an ecosystem, strictly speaking; it is a loose collection of myriads of 
ecosystems. So any ethicist must be talking loosely, perhaps poetically or romantically, 
of valuing Earth. Earth is a mere thing, a big thing, a special thing for those who happen 
to live on it, but still a thing, and not appropriate as an object of intrinsic or systemic 
valuation. We do not have duties to rocks, air, ocean, dirt or Earth; we have duties to 
people, or sentient things. We must not confuse duties to the home with duties to the 
inhabitants. Nature, not ultimately important, is (in the literal sense) provisionally 
important. Any condition of nature that supplies and sustains such opportunities 
will be acceptable. 
The radical environmental ethic finds, however, that this humanistic account fails 
to recognize the globally relevant survival unit: Earth and its biosphere. The bottom 
line, trans-cultural and non-negotiable, is a sustainable biosphere. That is the ultimate 
expanding circle: the full Earth, The us-and-our-sustainable-resources view is not a sys-
temic analysis of what is taking place. The planet is a self-organizing biosphere, which 
has produced and continues to support all the Earthbound values. Earth is the source 
of value, and therefore value-able, able to produce value itself. This generativity is the 
most fundamental meaning of the term 'nature', 'to give birth'. Do not humans some-
times value Earth's life-supporting systems because they are valuable, and not always 
the other way round? 
True, humans are the only evaluators who can reflect about what is going on in 
animals, plants, species lines, over evolutionary history, or at global scales, or who can 
deliberate about what they ought to do conserving it. When humans do this, they must 
set up the scales; and humans are the measurers of things. Animals, organisms, species, 
ecosystems, Earth, cannot teach us how to do this evaluating. But they can display 
what it is that is to be valued. The axiological scales we construct do not constitute the 
value, any more than the scientific scales we erect create what we thereby measure. 
Humans are not so much lighting up value in a merely potentially valuable world, as 
they are psychologically joining ongoing planetary natural history in which there is 
value wherever there is positive creativity. An axiological ethics ought to optimize the 
value levels and diversity on Earth, both natural and cultural. To put this theologically, 
humans are trustees, as well as stewards with dominion. 
At depth, such an Earth ethics asks whether the European Enlightenment is compat-
ible with the emerging ecological movement, both theoretically and practically. Science, 
technology, industry, democracy, human rights, freedom, preference satisfaction, max-
imizing benefits over costs, consumerism—all these 'management ethics' are outcomes 
of the Enlightenment world view. And they are all seriously implicated as causes of the 
environmental crisis. Much of the enthusiastic humanism that the Enlightenment stood 
for has been a good thing in modern times; but today, with an environmental turn, it 
needs to be ecologically chastened. Ethics needs to become postmodern. 
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Development in the West has been based on the Enlightenment myth of endless 
growth. But in the United States and Europe, whether one considers agricultural devel-
opment, forests cut, rivers dammed and diverted for water, lands fenced, minerals 
extracted, or highways and subdivisions built, the next hundred years cannot be like 
the last hundred years. None of the developed nations have yet settled into a sustain-
able culture on their landscapes. 
On these scales 'sustainable' also means 'fair' or 'just', an ethics of eco-justice. On 
Earth, the developed nations hold about one-fifth of the world's 5 billion persons, and 
they produce and consume about four-fifths of all goods and services. The underdevel-
oped nations, with four-fifths of the world's people, produce and consume one-fifth. Of 
the 90 million new people on Earth each year, 85 million appear in the Third World, 
the countries least able to support them, and the result is poverty and environmental 
degradation in a feedback loop. Meanwhile, the 5 million new people in the industrial 
countries will put as much strain on the environment as the 85 million new poor. 
The over-consumption problem in the developed nations is linked with the under-
consumption problem in the developing nations, and this results in increasing envi-
ronmental degradation in both sets of nations. Sustainable development must close the 
gap between the rich and the poor, between and also within nations. Even if there were 
an equitable distribution of wealth, the human population cannot go on escalating 
without people becoming more and more poor, because the pie has to be constantly 
divided into smaller pieces. Even if there were no future population growth, consump-
tion patterns cannot go on escalating on a finite Earth. There are three problems: over-
population, over-consumption, and under-distribution. 
Once the mark of an educated and ethical person could be summed up as civitas, the 
privileges, rights and responsibilities of citizenship. People ought to be upright and 
moral, productive in their communities, leaders in business, the professions, govern-
ment, church, education. That was the responsibility that went with one's rights. The 
mark of a virtuous person today, increasingly, is something more—so environmental 
ethicists claim. It is not enough to be a good 'citizen', for that is only half the truth; we 
are 'residents' dwelling on landscapes. A century ago, a call for community was typi-
cally phrased as the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God. For most of the 
twentieth century the call was phrased as justice and human rights. In this century 
such a call must be more ecological and less paternalistic, less humanistic and more 
global. We are expanding ethics: it is not just what a society does to its slaves, women, 
blacks, minorities, handicapped, children or future generations, but what it does to 
its fauna, flora, species, ecosystems and landscapes that reveals the character of 
that society. We humans are Earthlings and care for the Earth is a developing and an 
ultimate human virtue. 
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Discussion Questions 
1 Are humans the only valuable, valuing agents in an otherwise value-free world? 
2 Do philosophers have a special role in the development of environmental ethics? 
3 Do values arise only with the interests and preferences of humans? 
4 Is humanistic philosophy necessarily anthropocentric? 
5 How similar is the inseparability of culture and nature to the inseparability of 
minds and bodies? 
6 Do humans need to include nature in their ethics and need to include themselves 
in nature? 
7 Do humans have serious duties only to each other? 
8 Are there ethical concerns that go beyond the scope of a social contract? 
9 Is the health of the environment of ethical importance as well as the health of 
human beings within the environment? 
 
10 What weight should environmental ethics give to the values of animals? Who 
should represent these concerns? 
11 What distinguishes an animal rights ethic from an animal welfare ethic? 
12 Does kinship to humans give animals moral standing? 
13 How can we determine whether the widening circles of ethical concern end with 
reciprocating moral agents? 
14 Does evolutionary success make animal life a good thing? 
15 Can we value kinds of experience that we cannot share? 
16 What justifies giving moral value to non-sentient living things? 
17 Is the biological identity of individuals or species enough to justify moral concern? 
18 Plants can thrive or fall ill, and they function to preserve their life or their species. 
Does this give them moral standing? 
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19 Are spontaneous natural lives of value in themselves? 
20 Do we have duties to species? 
21 If the type is more important than the token for animal and plant species, is the 
same true for the human species? What would be the social and political consequences 
of this view? 
22 Is the fundamental unit of development and survival the appropriate unit for 
moral concern? 
23 How would greater moral sensitivity to the environment affect human social, 
political and economic systems? 
24 Who would be parties to a 'natural contract' that might supplement a social 
contract? 
25 Is an ecological ethic a matter of argument or vision? 
26 If Enlightenment values are incompatible with the ecological movement, which 
should be supported? 
2 7    How might justice and sustainable development be related? 
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